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In	his	essay	on	“Calvin	and	Civil	Government”	John	McNeill	remarks	
that,	‘Calvin’s	awe-stricken	consciousness	of	God	carries	with	it	no	
indifference	to	mundane	matters.	Rather	it	demands	the	most	intense	
participation	 in	 the	 common	 affairs	 of	 men.’1	 In	 this,	 Calvinists	
followed	the	master,	and	thus	differed	radically	from	the	Anabaptists,	
who	simply	pronounced	the	world	evil,	preached	world-renunciation	
and	held	as	a	fixed	dogma	that	Christians	could	not	serve	in	political	
life.	Lutheranism,	 too,	 tended	 to	keep	 its	distance	 from	 the	 secular.	
Politics	should	be	left	to	the	Prince,	while	believers	simply	enjoyed	
the	fruits	of	justification	by	faith,	uncontaminated	by	the	distractions	
of	public	theology.	
Calvin,	 by	 contrast,	 took	a	keen	personal	 interest	 in	 the	day-to-
day	affairs	of	Geneva;	and	while	he	wished	to	keep	the	clergy	out	of	
politics	 he	made	 sure	 that	 the	 politicians	were	 not	 short	 of	 clerical	
advice.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 he	 himself	 developed	 a	 comprehensive	
political	theology,	while	also	fostering	international	connections,	with	
the	 result	 that	 his	 political	 theology	 had	 repercussions	 far	 beyond	
Geneva.
Civil disobedience
One	of	 the	key	 issues	 to	occupy	Calvinist	political	 theologians	was	
civil	disobedience.	Calvin	himself	took	at	face	value	Paul’s	statement	
that	 the	powers	 that	 be	 are	ordained	by	God	and	 that,	 therefore,	 to	
resist	them	was	to	resist	the	ordinance	of	God	(Rom	13:1–7).	This	was	
true	regardless	of	the	particular	form	of	government.	His	own	personal	
preference	was	 for	 aristocracy,	 or	 some	 combination	 of	 aristocracy	
and	democracy,	but	while	he	was	no	lover	of	monarchy	he	regarded	it	
as	a	legitimate	form	of	government.	On	the	other	hand,	he	had	clear	
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reservations	about	undiluted	democracy:	it	was	too	easy	to	fall	from	
popular	rule	into	sedition.2	Besides,	government	derived	its	power	not	
from	the	people,	but	from	God,	and	while,	ideally,	it	should	have	the	
consent	of	 the	people,	 this	was	a	matter	of	providence.	 If	we	 lived	
under	such	a	government,	we	should	be	grateful,	but	the	mere	absence	
of	 popular	 consent	 or	 approval	 could	 not	 warrant	 disobedience	 or	
resistance.	 Government	 could	 be	 legitimate	 even	 when	 it	 was	 bad	
government,	as	in	the	instances	of	Nebuchadnezzar	and	Nero.	
Yet	Calvin	added	two	important	qualifications.
First,	 submission	 to	 government	 can	 never	 be	 an	 excuse	 for	
disobedience	to	God.	Here	Calvin	was	building	on	Acts	5:29,	‘We	must	
obey	God	rather	than	men.’	No	obedience	can	be	given	to	government	
when	it	commands	what	God	forbids,	or	forbids	what	God	commands.	
This	was	a	matter	of	 fundamental	 logic.	Since	we	obey	magistrates	
only	because	God	commands	it,	 it	would	be	absurd	to	disobey	God	
just	because	the	magistrate	commands	it.	‘If	they	command	anything	
against	him,	let	it	go	unesteemed.’3
Secondly,	while	private	citizens	may	not	resist,	the	lower	or	lesser	
magistrates	can.	Here	he	is	thinking	not	so	much	of	local	government	
as	 of	 those	 representative	 assemblies	 which	 are	 the	 constitutional	
guardians	of	the	liberties	of	the	people.	He	cites	classical	parallels	such	
as	the	ephors	of	Sparta	and	the	tribunes	of	Rome,	and	probably	has	in	
mind	the	Estates	of	France	(though	they	had	not	met	for	over	thirty	
years).	The	same	principle	would	apply	to	the	parliaments	of	Scotland	
and	England,	and	to	the	Estates	of	the	Netherlands.	It	was	incumbent	
on	 such	 bodies	 to	 restrain	 the	 fierce	 licentiousness	 of	 kings	 and	 to	
guard	those	freedoms	of	which	God	had	appointed	them	protectors.	
If	they	wink	at	kings	who	violently	fall	upon	the	lowly	common	folk,	
‘their	dissimulation	involves	nefarious	perfidy.’4
This	was	not	a	reluctant	concession	to	popular	representatives.	It	
was	a	statement	of	moral	obligation,	and	as	Calvin’s	editor,	Dr.	John	T.	
McNeill,	points	out	it	was	to	prove	‘powerfully	influential’.5	Nowhere	
would	 it	 be	 more	 powerful	 than	 in	 Scotland,	 where	 Reformation	
would	 mesh	 with	 Revolution	 and	 the	 Lords	 of	 the	 Congregation	
would	 collaborate	 with	 the	 Estates	 of	 Parliament	 in	 defiance	 of	
the	 monarchy.	 Later,	 when	 Charles	 I	 attempted	 to	 impose	 Laud’s	
Liturgy	 by	 royal	 decree,	 Alexander	 Henderson	 proceeded	 by	 the	
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same	principle,	first	of	all	winning	the	support	of	the	Privy	Council,	
and	then	channelling	the	energies	of	the	aristocracy	and	the	outrage	
of	 the	people	 into	 a	 constitutional	movement,	 under	 the	 instrument	
of	 the	National	 Covenant.	 In	 England,	 Parliament	 would	 risk	 civil	
war	 to	 restrain	 royal	 absolutism,	while	 in	America	 it	would	 be	 the	
Congress	of	the	United	Colonies	which	would	issue	their	Declaration	
of	 Independence.	 In	 all	 these	 instances,	 the	 lower	magistrates	 took	
responsibility	as	guardians	of	their	people’s	freedoms.	
Scottish	 Calvinism	 built	 its	 political	 theology	 on	 Calvin’s	
foundation,	but	developed	it	in	a	much	more	radical	direction.	Knox	
joined	 battle	 with	 authority	 almost	 immediately,	 though	 the	 Scots 
Confession	 is	curiously	restrained:	‘we	confess	and	avow	that	those	
who	resist	the	supreme	powers,	so	long	as	they	are	acting	in	their	own	
spheres,	are	resisting	God’s	ordinance	and	cannot	be	held	guiltless’.6	
Even	 so,	 the	 qualification,	 ‘so	 long	 as	 they	 are	 acting	 in	 their	 own	
spheres’,	is	ominous;	and	in	his	later	interviews	with	the	Queen	and	
in	his	debate	with	Maitland	of	Lethington	Knox	stated	categorically	
that	when	the	governing	powers	trespassed	beyond	their	spheres	the	
people	had	every	right	to	resist	them.7
For	 the	 following	 century-and-a-half	 Scottish	 history	 was	
dominated	by	the	determination	of	the	crown	to	dominate	the	church.	
Matters	came	to	a	head	with	the	Restoration	of	1660,	when	Charles	
II	arrogated	to	himself	absolute	power	in	all	matters	spiritual	as	well	
as	 temporal.	The	struggle	 for	 spiritual	 independence	 then	became	a	
struggle	against	political	tyranny;	the	end-product	would	be	the	defeat	
of	absolutism	and	the	introduction	of	constitutional	monarchy.	
Undergirding	 the	 struggle	was	 a	well-developed	 theory	 of	 civil	
disobedience,	expounded	in	a	voluminous	literature.8	Fundamental	to	
this	was	the	belief	that	all	human	beings	are	equal.	‘All	men	are	born	
alike	as	to	Civil	power’,	wrote	Alexander	Shields,	‘no	man	being	born	
with	a	Crown	on	his	head’.9	No-one,	therefore,	had	a	divine	right	to	
lord	it	over	his	fellow	human	beings.	Even	less	could	civic	eminence	
give	anyone	the	right	to	lord	it	over	the	church.	As	Andrew	Melville	
daringly	reminded	James	VI,	there	were	two	kings	and	two	kingdoms	
in	Scotland,	and	in	the	kingdom	of	God	he	was	neither	‘a	king,	nor	a	
lord,	nor	a	head,	but	a	member.’10	
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Linked	to	this	was	the	idea	that	government	requires	the	consent	of	
the	people.	To	Calvin,	such	consent	was	a	luxury:	a	gift	of	providence,	
for	which	we	should	be	grateful,	but	not	essential	 to	 the	 legitimacy	
of	 an	 administration.	 Scotland’s	 political	 theologians	 went	 much	
further.	‘[T]here	is	no	Title	on	earth	now	to	Crowns’,	wrote	Alexander	
Shields,	‘[…]	but	the	people’s	suffrage’.11	They	could	give	power	on	
the	basis	of	heredity.	They	could	even	give	it	on	the	basis	of	conquest	
(if	 the	 conqueror	 guaranteed	 their	 liberties).	 But	 their	 consent	 and	
concurrence	were	essential.	
Yet	 this	 consent	 was	 given	 only	 on	 certain	 conditions,	 and	
conferred	only	limited	power.	It	was	this	that	precipitated	the	conflict	
between	Scottish	Calvinism	and	the	Stewarts,	who	claimed	absolute	
power	as	 their	divine	prerogative	and	interpreted	such	power	as	 the	
right	to	enact	whatever	laws	they	pleased,	repeal	whatever	laws	they	
pleased,	direct	 their	 courts	 to	pass	whatever	 sentences	 they	pleased	
and	 deploy	 the	 soldiery	 against	 the	 people	 as	 they	 pleased.	 Over	
against	such	absolutism,	Scottish	Calvinism	protested	that	the	power	
of	monarchy	was	 limited	 by	 the	 constitution.	This	was	 ‘the	 law	of	
Nature	 and	 Nations’:	 ‘There	 must	 be	 a	 Conditionall	 reciprocally	
obliging	Covenant	between	the	Soveraign	and	the	Subjects,	without	
which	there	is	no	sucn	relation	to	be	ouned’,	and	‘when	this	compact	
is	broken	in	all	or	its	chiefest	conditions	by	the	Soveraign,	the	people’s	
obligation	ceases.’12	This	was	the	precise	point	laboured	by	Rutherford	
in	Lex Rex,	where	the	title	suggests	not	only	the	theme	of	his	treatise	
(the	Law	and	the	Prince)	but	also	its	core	idea,	‘the	law	is	king’	(in	
direct	contrast	 to	Louis	XIV’s	famous	dictum,	‘La	 loi,	c’est	moi!’).	
‘The	law’,	wrote	Rutherford,	‘hath	a	supremacy	of	constitution	above	
the	king’.13
Scottish	divines	were	particularly	irritated	by	the	suggestion	that	
Paul’s	 argument	 in	 Romans	 13	 stipulated	 unconditional	 obedience.	
Even	Calvin	had	warned	that	magistrates	
[…]	are	not	 to	 rule	on	 their	own	account,	but	 for	 the	public	
good.	 Nor	 do	 they	 have	 unbridled	 power,	 but	 power	 that	 is	
restricted	 to	 the	welfare	 of	 their	 subjects.	 In	 short,	 they	 are	
responsible	to	God	and	to	men	in	the	exercise	of	their	rule.14	
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Rutherford	was	more	forthright:	
It	is	evident	from	Rom.	xiii.	that	all	subjection	and	obedience	
to	higher	powers	commanded	there,	is	subjection	to	the	power	
of	the	magistrate	in abstracto,	or,	which	is	all	one,	to	the	person	
using	the	power	lawfully,	and	that	no	subjection	is	due	by	that	
text,	or	any	word	of	God,	to	the	abused	and	tyrannical	power	
of	the	king15	
The	fundamental	question	then	becomes	what	attitude	is	to	be	taken	
when	government	itself	is	perverted,	exalts	evil	instead	of	punishing	
it,	 and	 puts	 the	 righteous	 to	 the	 sword.	Here	 the	 Scottish	Calvinist	
answer	 was	 unhesitating:	 ‘a	man	 commanding	 unjustly,	 and	 ruling	
tyrannically,	hath,	in	that,	no	power	from	God.’16	When	that	point	is	
reached,	the	people	have	every	right	to	disown	the	ruling	power,	which	
is	exactly	what	the	Cameronians	did	in	the	Sanquhar	Declaration:	
[…]	we	for	ourselves	and	all	that	will	adhere	to	us	[…]	do	by	
thir	presents	disown	Charles	Stuart,	that	has	been	reigning	(or	
rather	tyrannizing	as	we	may	say)	on	the	throne	of	Britain	these	
years	bygone,	as	having	any	right,	title	to,	or	interest	in	the	said	
crown	of	Scotland	for	government.17	
But	they	weren’t	content	with	merely	withdrawing	recognition.	They	
declared	unambiguously	that	it	was	right	to	resist	tyranny	by	force	of	
arms;	and	they	acted	accordingly.	The	Informatory Vindication	(1687)	
is	in	effect	a	theological	defence	of	the	deployment	of	the	Covenanter	
armies	at	Bothwell	Bridge	and	Ayrsmoss	(and	even	of	the	assassination	
of	Archbishop	Sharpe).	John	Brown’s	Apologetical Relation	devotes	
a	long	chapter	to	‘the	lawfulness	of	Scotland’s	defensive	war’,	while	
Alexander	Shields	devotes	118	pages	to	‘the	refusal	to	own	tyrants’	
authority’,	58	pages	to	the	right	to	bear	defensive	arms,	and	63	pages	
to	‘the	extraordinary	execution	of	judgement	by	private	men’	(in	other	
words,	judicial	assassination).18
These	 extended	 treatments	 reflect	 the	 extreme	 circumstances	
in	 which	 Scottish	 Calvinists	 found	 themselves	 between	 1660	
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and	 1688,	 but	 these	 same	 positions	 had	 already	 been	 laid	 down	 in	
relatively	quieter	times	by	John	Knox,	George	Buchanan	and	Samuel	
Rutherford.	Even	Alexander	Henderson,	whose	diplomatic	 instincts	
stood	in	marked	contrast	to	the	passionate	activism	of	Knox,	argued	
cogently	that	it	is	lawful	to	take	up	arms	against	government	when	it	
resorts	to	extreme	violence	and	oppression,	to	the	ruin	and	desolation	
of	both	kirk	and	kingdom.19
Yet	resistance	was	never	the	policy	of	first	resort.	Even	the	later	
Covenanters	 carefully	 qualified	 their	 advocacy	 of	 armed	 struggle.	
No	mere	 difference	 of	 religion	 could	 justify	 such	 resistance:	Knox	
told	Mary	that	he	was	as	ready	to	obey	her	as	the	Apostle	Paul	was	
to	 obey	Nero.20	Nor	 could	 random	 acts	 of	 incompetence	 or	 cruelty	
justify	the	resort	to	arms.	Shields	even	went	so	far	as	to	say	that	where	
there	was	the	least	doubt	as	to	the	tyrannical	nature	of	the	government	
there	could	be	no	justifiable	armed	rebellion.21	But	where	there	was	
tyranny,	 the	Covenanter	 theologians	had	no	hesitation.	Citizens	had	
an	absolute	right	to	take	up	defensive	arms	whenever	kings	threatened	
the	safety	of	the	people,	trampled	on	their	rights	and	liberties,	extorted	
taxes	to	finance	their	own	vices	and	luxuries,	or	used	the	military	to	
engage	in	a	reign	of	terror.
It	would	be	wrong	to	claim	originality	for	such	views.	Indeed,	part	
of	 their	 argument	was	 precisely	 that	 such	 views	were	not	 original,	
but	went	back	to	the	constitutional	history	of	Scotland	and	even	the	
constitutional	history	of	most	of	the	countries	of	Europe.	In	line	with	
this,	 their	 publications	 are	 laced	with	 quotations	 from	 the	 classical	
jurists	of	Greece	and	Rome,	 the	church	fathers,	 the	scholastics,	and	
such	contemporaries	as	Hugo	Grotius.	
This	 complicates	 the	 question	 of	 their	 influence.	 The	 Glorious	
Revolution	of	1688	 set	 up	more	or	 less	 exactly	 the	kind	of	 limited	
monarchy	 advocated	 by	 Buchanan	 and	 Rutherford,22	 driving	 one	
contemporary	to	remark,	‘We	have	been	hanging	and	shooting	honest	
men	for	wildness,	and	now	we	are	all	turned	wild	together.’23	But	many	
influences	 contributed	 to	 these	 developments.	 William	 of	 Orange	
was	reared	in	the	Calvinist	political	theology	of	the	Netherlands,	and	
ever	 since	 the	days	of	William	 the	Silent	 his	 family	had	 led	Dutch	
resistance	to	Spanish	tyranny,	but	he	was	never	more	than	lukewarm	
towards	 Presbyterianism;	 and	 though	 his	 closest	 confidantes	 were	
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Thomas	 Hog	 and	 William	 Carstares,	 both	 of	 whom	 had	 played	
conspicuous	parts	in	the	Covenanter	resistance,	the	decisive	invitation	
to	 the	 Crown	 of	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 came	 from	 London’s	Whig	
grandees,	who	drew	their	inspiration	not	from	Lex Rex,	but	from	the	
circle	 of	 John	 Locke.	 Even	 though	 Locke’s	Two Treatises of Civil 
Government 24	 was	 not	 published	 till	 1690	 (specifically	 to	 justify	
the	Revolution)	 the	ideas	he	propounded	were	clearly	in	circulation	
before	then.	As	it	happens,	Locke’s	views	on	the	power	of	the	people	
and	their	right	to	resist	tyranny	were	very	similar	to	those	of	Calvin	
and	the	Scottish	theologians,	but	the	main	theological	source	on	which	
Locke	draws	is	Richard	Hooker’s	Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity.	What	
is	clear,	however,	 is	 that	 in	England,	Scotland	and	Holland	the	idea	
of	constitutional	monarchy	had	developed	along	Calvinist	lines.	The	
same	would	have	happened	in	France	had	it	not	been	for	the	savage	
suppression	of	Protestantism	following	the	revocation	of	the	Edict	of	
Nantes	 (1685).	When	France	 eventually	 did	 have	 its	Revolution,	 it	
was	divorced	from	all	religious	principle	and	quickly	degenerated	into	
an	anarchic	frenzy.
These	same	ideas	of	Locke	and	Rutherford	were	also	brewing	in	the	
New	World,	particularly	among	Presbyterians	and	Congregationalists.	
This	 is	 hardly	 surprising	 considering	 that	 many	 of	 the	 early	
immigrants	were	religious	refugees	who	had	faced	the	hazards	of	the	
ocean	 rather	 than	endure	 tyranny	and	 intolerance.	As	 the	 ineptitude	
of	government	pushed	the	colonists	ever	closer	to	resistance,	one	of	
their	grievances	was	precisely	the	fact	that	the	‘lesser	magistrate’	(the	
British	 Parliament),	 far	 from	 representing	 their	 interests	 as	 British	
citizens,	was	itself	an	instrument	of	repression.	Yet,	when	they	were	
finally	 goaded	 into	 launching	 their	 struggle	 for	 independence	 they	
were	 careful	 to	 do	 so	 not	 as	 private	 citizens	 but	 through	 coherent	
action	sanctioned	by	the	Conventions	of	individual	states;	and	when	
the	Declaration	of	Independence	was	issued	on	4	July	1776	it	came,	as	
Calvin	would	have	advised,	from	‘The	Representatives	of	the	United	
States	of	America	in	General	Congress	assembled’.	
Among	those	who	signed	was	John	Witherspoon,	once	minister	in	
Beith	(Ayrshire)	and	later	in	Paisley,	but	since	1768	President	of	the	
College	of	New	Jersey.	Witherspoon	played	a	full	part	in	steeling	the	
resolve	of	the	colonists.	In	“Thoughts	on	American	Liberty”	he	called	
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on	‘the	approaching	Congress’	to	declare,	‘not	only	that	we	esteem	the	
claim	of	the	British	Parliament	to	be	illegal	and	unconstitutional,	but	
that	we	are	firmly	determined	never	to	submit	to	it,	and	do	deliberately	
prefer	war	with	all	its	horrors,	and	even	extermination	itself,	to	slavery	
riveted	on	us	and	our	posterity.’25	Later,	looking	back	on	the	conflict,	
he	wrote	with	pride,	‘Not	only	every	colony,	by	its	representative	body,	
but	every	county,	and	almost	every	corporation	or	other	subordinate	
division,	publicly	declared	that	they	would	defend	their	liberty	at	the	
risk	of	their	estates	and	lives.’26
Almost	two	centuries	later,	in	May	1934,	the	Confessional	Synod	
of	 the	German	Evangelical	Church	 issued	 the	Barmen	Declaration.	
Drafted	by	Karl	Barth,	it	clearly	reflected	his	Reformed	perspective,	
even	 though	 it	was	 adopted	equally	 cordially	by	 the	Lutherans	 and	
the	United	Churches.	 It	 was	 not	 a	 protest	 against	Nazism	 as	 such,	
nor	 specifically	 against	 the	 anti-Semitism	of	 the	Third	Reich.	Even	
less	was	it	a	threat	of	civil	disobedience	and	armed	resistance.	It	was	
a	protest	 against	 the	 ideology	of	 the	 ‘German	Christians’,	who	had	
allowed	Hitler	 to	 turn	 the	 church	 into	 an	 arm	of	 the	 state	 and	 thus	
endorsed	Nazism	in	the	name	of	Christianity.	From	Barth’s	point	of	
view,	this	was	idolatry.	By	giving	the	state	lordship	over	the	church	
the	German	Christians	were	 in	 breach	 of	 the	 First	 Commandment.	
The	Declaration	would	later	have	wider	political	ramifications,	but	in	
the	first	instance	the	Confessing	Churches	were	taking	their	stand	on	
the	Spiritual	Independence	of	the	church:	exactly	where	the	Scottish	
Covenanters	had	stood	in	the	seventeenth	century.	
The	 Declaration	 is	 an	 unambiguous	 exposé	 of	 the	 underlying	
philosophy	of	the	German	Christians.	It	totally	rejects	the	idea	that	the	
church	should	have	to	acknowledge	the	authority	of	other	figures	and	
powers	besides	Christ	and	his	Word.	Equally	emphatically,	 it	warns	
that	 the	state	has	no	right	 to	go	beyond	 its	ordinary,	appointed	 task	
of	providing	for	justice	and	peace,	and	to	aspire	instead	to	becoming	
the	 single,	 totalitarian	 arbiter	 of	 human	 life,	 even	 to	 the	 extent	 of	
excluding	 the	church	from	her	own	legitimate,	spiritual	sphere.	But	
the	Declaration	also	insisted	on	the	converse:	the	church	cannot,	over	
and	above	her	special	commission	to	deliver	the	message	of	the	free	
grace	of	God,	clothe	herself	with	the	dignity	of	the	state,	assume	its	
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characteristics	or	perform	its	tasks.	Even	less	can	she	place	the	Word	
of	 the	Lord	at	 the	service	of	arbitrarily	chosen	human	programmes,	
investing	them	with	the	aura	of	the	divine.27
This	 was	 a	 courageous	 voice,	 and	 its	 ultimate	 implementation	
would	cost	many	of	its	adherents	dear.	But	it	was	also	a	dramatically	
un-German	 one.	There,	 for	 centuries,	 the	 Lutheran	 principle,	 cuius 
regio eius religio, had	prevailed,	effectively	silencing	political	protest	
on	the	part	of	the	church.	Here	at	Barmen,	she	is	un-gagged,	but	when	
she	speaks	she	speaks	with	a	Swiss,	not	a	German	accent;	and	Barth	is	
quickly	reminded	that	he	is	an	alien.
Theocracy
In	its	own	perverse	way,	the	German	Christian	movement	was	a	step	
towards	theocracy,	or	at	least	an	unholy	alliance	between	the	church	
and	a	dictatorship.	Calvin	had	argued	passionately	for	the	separation	of	
church	and	state:	‘Christ’s	spiritual	kingdom	and	the	civil	jurisdiction	
are	 things	 completely	 distinct.’28	 The	 two	 kingdoms	 had	 different	
objects	 and	different	 jurisdictions;	 and	 these	 two	 jurisdictions	must	
not	meddle	with	each	other.	
But	while	it	was	easy	to	lay	down	the	principle,	 it	was	far	from	
easy	 to	work	 it	 out	 in	 practice,	 and	 this	 quickly	 becomes	 apparent	
in	Calvin	himself.	For	all	his	insistence	on	the	separation	of	the	two	
kingdoms	he	firmly	believed	that	there	is	an	obligation	on	the	state	to	
promote	 true	 religion.	 It	must	cherish	 the	outward	worship	of	God,	
defend	sound	doctrine	and	protect	the	position	of	the	church.29	This	
was	 not	 remotely	 innovative,	 however.	 Indeed,	 it	 fell	 considerably	
short	of	the	position	laid	down	by	Pope	Boniface	VIII,	whose	Bull,	
Unam sanctam	(1302),	had	declared	that	the	temporal	power	is	subject	
to	the	spiritual;	that	the	temporal	sword,	no	less	than	the	spiritual,	is	in	
the	power	of	St	Peter;	and	that	while	that	sword	is	not	be	wielded	by	
the	Church	it	is	to	be	wielded	for her.	
The	 later	Reformed	confessions	 followed	Calvin	 in	 this	 respect.	
The	Westminster	Confession	(Chapter	XXIII),	for	example,	lays	down	
that	it	is	the	duty	of	government	
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[…]	 to	 take	 order	 that	 unity	 and	 peace	 be	 preserved	 in	 the	
Church,	that	the	truth	of	God	be	kept	pure	and	entire,	that	all	
blasphemies	 and	 heresies	 be	 suppressed,	 all	 corruptions	 and	
abuses	 in	worship	and	discipline	prevented	or	 reformed,	and	
all	 the	 ordinances	 of	 God	 duly	 settled,	 administrated,	 and	
observed.	
The	Belgic	Confession	(Article	36)	strikes	the	same	note:	
[…]	 the	 government’s	 task	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 caring	 for	 and	
watching	over	the	public	domain	but	extends	also	to	upholding	
the	sacred	ministry,	with	a	view	to	removing	and	destroying	all	
idolatry	and	false	worship	of	the	Antichrist;	to	promoting	the	
kingdom	of	Jesus	Christ;	and	to	furthering	the	preaching	of	the	
gospel	everywhere;	to	the	end	that	God	may	be	honoured	and	
served	by	everyone,	as	he	requires	in	his	Word.
This	suggestion	of	a	statutory	enforcement	of	‘pure	doctrine’	brings	us	
perilously	close	to	the	idea	of	a	theocratic	union	of	church	and	state,	
and	has	proved	a	serious	embarrassment	 to	 the	Reformed	churches.	
What	are	we	to	make	of	it	today?
The	first	point	to	bear	in	mind	is	that	Calvinism	has	always	stressed	
that	the	whole	of	human	life	is	subject	to	the	authority	of	God	and	the	
lordship	of	Christ.	Objectively,	this	follows	directly	from	the	premise	
that	God	 exists;	 subjectively	 it	 follows	 from	 the	 awareness	 of	God	
(sensus deitatis) engraven	on	every	human	heart;	Christologically	it	
follows	from	Jesus’	own	claim,	‘All	authority	is	mine	in	heaven	and	
on	earth’	(Matt	28:18).	This	is	what	underlay	Abraham	Kuyper’s	oft-
quoted	dictum,	 ‘There	 is	not	 a	 square	 inch	 in	 the	whole	domain	of	
our	human	existence	over	which	Christ,	who	is	Sovereign	of	all,	does	
not	 cry,	 “Mine!”’30	This	 applies	 as	much	 to	 the	public	 square	 as	 to	
personal	religion;	to	the	meetings	of	Cabinet	as	to	the	gatherings	of	
the	church.	The	alternative	notion	that	God’s	sovereignty	is	limited	to	
personal	and	private	matters	is	itself	blatantly	atheistic,	positing	at	best	
only	a	limited	deity.	For	the	politician	as	well	as	for	the	theologian,	
Christ	has	risen;	for	the	scientist	as	well	as	for	the	priest,	he	is	Lord.	
He	excludes	himself	from	no	sphere,	and	one	day,	every	government	
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will	stand	before	his	Judgement	Throne.	It	was	in	accordance	with	this	
vision	that	Calvinism	developed	its	‘capacity	to	penetrate	the	political	
and	economic	movements	of	Western	nations	with	its	religious	ideals,	
a	capacity	which	Lutheranism	lacked	from	the	very	beginning.’31
Secondly,	the	church	must	bear	witness	to	the	state.	If	the	powers	
that	be	are	to	function	as	servants	of	God	(Rom	13:1),	they	must	know	
his	will.	But	how?	There	is,	of	course,	the	light	of	nature	(Westminster	
Confession,	1:1):	the	witness	of	conscience,	and	the	general	sense	of	
equity	engraved	on	every	heart.	But	Christ	also	exercises	his	lordship	
through	his	Word,	and	of	that	Word	the	church	is	the	custodian	and	
expositor.	 Her	 primary	 responsibility	 in	 the	 political	 domain	 is	 to	
bring	the	light	of	scripture	to	bear	on	the	conduct	of	government.	This	
is	exactly	what	Barth	and	the	Confessing	Christians	sought	to	do	in	
the	Barmen	Declaration,	but	it	inevitably	carries	its	own	dangers.	It	is	
easy	to	confuse	prejudice	with	revelation,	and	easier	still	to	confuse	
justice	with	law	and	order.	The	Christian	Right	will	focus	on	abortion,	
euthanasia	 and	 reproductive	 issues;	 the	Christian	 left	 on	 capitalism	
and	disarmament.	In	both	cases	the	focus	is	too	narrow,	and	the	link	
with	the	divine	word	often	fragile.	The	besetting	sin	of	government,	
from	Nebuchadnezzar	to	Hitler,	is	self-deification,	and	the	perennial	
obligation	of	the	church	is	to	bear	witness	against	corporate	idolatry.
But	we	have	also	to	search	out	the	implications	for	politics	of	the	
rigorous	personal	ethics	of	the	New	Testament.	Whatever	the	difficulties	
of	adjustment,	the	whole	political	process	must	be	illuminated	by	the	
Sermon	on	the	Mount,	which	means	that	over	against	realpolitik	we	
have	to	call	for	national	meekness	and	mercifulness,	and	even	for	a	
willingness	to	turn	the	other	cheek.	Similarly,	we	have	to	flag	up	the	
political	implications	of	kenosis.	This	means	not	only	that	politicians	
must	 be	 servants,	 indifferent	 to	 personal	 interests,	 but	 that	 nations,	
too,	must	be	willing	to	be	nothing.	Only	thus	can	we	escape	from	the	
demonic	rule	that	in	diplomacy	there	are	no	principles,	only	interests.
Above	all,	the	church	must	bear	constant	witness	to	the	principle,	
‘Remember	the	poor’	(Gal	2:10).	The	most	memorable	expression	of	
this	came	from	the	Lutheran,	Dietrich	Bonhoeffer,	writing	 from	his	
prison	cell:	‘We	have	for	once	learned	to	see	the	great	events	of	world	
history	from	below,	from	the	perspective	of	the	outcast,	the	suspects,	
the	maltreated,	 the	powerless,	 the	oppressed,	 the	 reviled’.32	But	 the	
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same	 concern	 had	 been	 expressed	 by	Thomas	Chalmers	 a	 hundred	
years	earlier:	‘Let	kings	retain	their	sceptres,	and	nobles	their	coronets	
–	 what	 we	 want	 is	 a	 more	 elevated	 ground-floor	 for	 our	 general	
population’.33
Every	 political	 programme,	 and	 every	 government	 policy,	must	
be	judged	from	this	perspective.	The	question	is	not	how	things	affect	
the	pound	in	our	pocket.	Even	 less	(and	 this	 is	a	subtle	 trap)	 is	 it	a	
matter	of	how	they	affect	the	church.	The	question	is	how	they	affect	
those	without	a	pound	in	their	pocket	or	even	a	roof	over	their	head.	
The	church	has	to	address	government	on	behalf	of	those	who	cannot	
speak	for	themselves.
Thirdly,	Calvinism	has	asserted	the	right	of	the	church	to	participate	
in	the	political	process.	In	fact,	the	very	nature	of	politics	makes	this	
unavoidable,	 since	politics	affects	everything.34	Left	unchecked,	 the	
political	machine	can	plunge	the	poor	into	even	deeper	poverty	and	
deprive	the	powerless	of	every	freedom.	The	crucial	thing,	however,	is	
that	the	church	cannot	engage	in	politics	from	a	position	of	privilege.	
She	cannot	claim	a	position	of	dominance,	as	if	the	very	fact	of	her	
special	relationship	with	Christ	gave	her	the	right	to	sit	at	the	top	table.	
She	must	pursue	her	political	goals	not	by	coercion,	but	by	persuasion.	
But	must	we	add	another	caveat:	that	while	individual	Christians	
may	 engage	 in	 politics	 the	 church	 as	 such	may	 not?	 This	 was	 the	
position	of	Abraham	Kuyper,	who	drew	a	clear	distinction	between	
the	church	as	organism and	the	church	as	institution.35	The	latter	was	
the	 church	 formally	 organised	 and	 acting	 through	 its	 office-bearers	
and	official	structures.	This	institution,	according	to	Kuyper,	should	
have	no	political	voice.	The	church	as	organism,	on	the	other	hand,	
is	 the	 totality	 of	 believers	 dispersed	 through	 society,	 lacking	 any	
formal	 organisation,	 yet	 linked	 organically	 through	 their	 common	
membership	 of	 the	 body	 of	 Christ.	 These	 believers,	 according	 to	
Kuyper,	have	every	right	to	raise	a	political	voice.	But	he	went	further.	
Precisely	 because	 they	 are	 linked	 organically	 they	 have	 a	 right	 to	
form	associations:	for	example,	to	set	up	parent-controlled	Christian	
schools	or	even	(as	in	Kuyper’s	own	case)	Christian	political	parties.	
This	 was	 a	 corner-stone	 of	 Kuyper’s	 public	 theology,	 and	 few	
will	deny	the	right	of	individual	Christians	to	be	politically	engaged	
or	even	their	right	 to	form	Christian	associations	for	specific	public	
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objects.	Martin	Luther	King’s	Civil	Rights	movement	was	 such	 an	
association;	and	so,	too,	are	TEAR	Fund	and	Christian	Aid.	But	it	is	
hard	 to	see	why	 the	church	 (or	 indeed	any	other	 institution)	should	
be	 proscribed	 from	 raising	 its	 political	 voice.	 Certainly,	 the	 clergy	
should	not	be	politicians	nor	churches	aligned	to	political	parties.	Nor	
should	 the	 pulpit	 be	 politicised.	 But	 to	 argue	 that	 churches	 should	
confine	themselves	to	their	‘spiritual’	commission	is	to	draw	too	sharp	
a	distinction	between	 the	 sacred	 and	 the	 secular.	Politics	 cannot	be	
placed	beyond	the	range	of	the	Word,	nor	can	there	be	any	effective	
championing	of	the	poor	where	there	has	to	be	a	studied	avoidance	of	
politically	loaded	(and	sometimes	even	explosive)	speech.	The	church	
cannot	confine	herself	 to	being	a	social	 life-boat	authorised	only	 to	
rescue	 the	 victims	 of	 recurring	 disasters.	 Poverty	 and	 injustice	 are	
structural,	and	the	church	must	raise	its	voice	against	such	structures.	
Even	today,	she	has	enviable	resources	and	it	would	be	a	dereliction	of	
duty	not	to	use	them	on	behalf	of	the	underprivileged.	Protest	against	
an	 intellectually	 bankrupt	 penal	 system	 or	 against	 the	 inhumane	
treatment	of	immigrants	cannot	be	left	to	either	individual	Christians	
or	to	voluntary	associations.
But	while	she	speaks	with	a	clear	Christian	voice	the	church	must	
at	the	same	time	be	the	champion	of	religious	freedom,	and	indeed	of	
all	other	freedoms.	There	is	a	paradox	here.	Christianity	is	implicitly	
theocratic:	 it	wants	God’s	will	done	on	earth	as	 it	 is	 in	heaven,	and	
on	the	face	of	things	this	is	 totally	incompatible	with	pluralism.	On	
the	other	hand,	all	other	freedoms	are	implicit	 in	religious	freedom.	
The	 moment	 we	 grant	 freedom	 of	 religious	 belief	 and	 religious	
expression	 all	 other	 freedoms	 follow.	Yet	 this	 has	 been	 remarkably	
difficult	 to	 establish.	 Mediaeval	 Catholicism	 sought	 to	 establish	 a	
twofold	uniformity,	credal	and	institutional:	everyone	must	belong	to	
the	 one	 holy	Catholic	Church	 and	 everyone	must	 believe	 the	 same	
Creed.	 Lutheranism	 adopted	 the	 principle	 cuius regio eius religio: 
the	 whole	 nation	 followed	 the	 religion	 of	 the	 head	 of	 state.	 The	
Westminster	Confession	 of	Faith	went	 uncomfortably	 far	 down	 the	
same	road,	conceding	the	power	of	the	state	to	take	order	to	suppress	
blasphemy	and	heresy;	and	men	like	Samuel	Rutherford	came	close	to	
regarding	toleration	itself	as	heresy.	Post-Restoration	episcopacy	did	
all	in	its	power	to	suppress	dissent	in	England	and	even	Liberal	voices	
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such	as	John	Locke’s	argued	for	only	a	limited	toleration.	It	was	not	
to	 be	 extended	 to	 Roman	Catholics,	 because	 they	 owed	 allegiance	
to	a	 foreign	power;	nor	 to	atheism,	because	 it	undermined	 the	very	
foundations	 of	 the	 state.36	 Even	 today,	 strident	 voices	 clamour	 for	
the	curtailment	of	 freedom	of	expression.	Parliament	may	refuse	 to	
pass	anti-blasphemy	laws,	but	it	has	no	compunction	about	adopting	
an	Act	banning	incitement	to	religious	hatred	(potentially	a	catch-all	
anti-blasphemy	Act	under	another	name).
The	alternative	is	 the	unlimited	pluralism	advocated	by	the	neo-
Calvinism	of	Abraham	Kuyper.	This	 involved	a	 radical	move	away	
from	 the	 previous	 vision	 of	 a	 national,	 institutionally	 privileged	
Reformed	church,	to	one	in	which	the	Reformed	were	but	one	party	
in	 a	 confessionally	 pluralistic	 society.37	 This	 vision	 included	 the	
insistence	that	all	religions,	and	all	Christian	denominations,	must	be	
tolerated.	But	 it	also	included	the	belief	 that	 that	 the	multiplicity	of	
denominations	(and	the	consequent	‘multiformity’	of	the	church),	far	
from	being	an	evil,	was	an	inevitable	result	of	liberty	of	conscience	
and	hence	contributed	to	the	rich	tapestry	of	Christian	expression.	On	
such	a	projection,	the	ecumenical	ideal	becomes	one	of	peaceful	and	
loving	co-existence	between	Christian	denominations	rather	than	their	
incorporation	into	one	mega-church.	
But	 Kuyper	 wanted	 to	 extend	 his	 idea	 of	 freedom	 beyond	 the	
religious	sphere,	and	in	particular	to	ensure	that	other	spheres	of	life	
were	kept	free	from	religious	tyranny.	Politics,	education,	science	and	
art	had	their	own	integrity	and	legitimacy,	and	while	accountable	to	
God,	they	were	ultimately	accountable	to	God	alone,	and	must	be	free	
from	all	ecclesiastical	interference.	No	religious	institution,	therefore,	
should	have	an	authoritative	or	privileged	position	in	these	domains.	
Within	its	own	sphere	each	was	sovereign.
The	essence	of	this	vision	is	that	we	concede	to	others	the	same	
freedom	 of	 belief	 and	 freedom	 of	 expression	 that	 we	 claim	 for	
ourselves.	As	Lord	Acton	famously	remarked,	‘The	test	of	liberty	is	
the	position	and	security	of	minorities.’	Kuyper	lived	and	worked	in	
a	world	in	which	Christianity	was	statistically	and	socially	dominant,	
and	history	has	a	right	to	judge	us	according	to	the	way	we	ourselves	
treated	 minorities.	 Today,	 we	 are	 the	 minority,	 forced	 for	 the	 first	
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time	in	almost	two	thousand	years	to	see	things	from	below,	and	as	
William	Bennett	points	out,	 the	only	 respectable	 form	of	bigotry	 is	
bigotry	 against	 religious	people.38	That	may	be	 a	 judgement	on	 the	
church’s	own	failure	to	practise	tolerance	in	the	past.	But	if	we	lose	
our	religious	freedom,	how	long	will	other	freedoms	survive?
Finally,	Calvinism	has	insisted	that	the	church	cannot	shrink	from	
the	culture	war.	This	was	already	implicit	 in	 the	Great	Commission	
with	its	directive	that	we	are	to	make	disciples	not	only	of	individuals,	
but	of	nations	(Matt	28:19).	This	was	the	clear	vision	behind	Thomas	
Chalmers’	 promotion	 of	 the	 godly	 commonwealth39	 and	 Abraham	
Kuyper’s	 dream	 of	 ‘a	 free	 church	 in	 a	 holy	 nation’.	 They	 aimed	
not	 only	 at	 the	 conversion	of	 individuals,	 but	 at	 the	 transformation	
of	society:	not	only	to	evangelise,	but	to	civilise.	There	was	nothing	
unique	about	such	a	vision.	Religion	inevitably	has	cultural	and	social	
consequences.	Mediaeval	Catholicism	had	already	secured	civic	and	
institutional	expression	 for	 its	own	values,	and	modern	 Islam	seeks	
the	same.	In	modern	North	America,	Evangelicals	strive	to	secure	a	
place	for	prayer	in	public	schools.	In	post-Reformation	Scotland,	the	
great	symbols	of	Christian	culture	were	the	church	schools	in	every	
parish,	the	sanctity	of	the	weekly	‘Sabbath’	and	the	social	influence	
of	 the	 pulpit,	 moulding	 the	 social	 consensus	 on	 such	 issues	 as	
marriage	and	divorce,	forming	attitudes	towards	the	arts,	leisure	and	
entertainment,	and	(eventually)	creating	a	climate	of	‘moderation’	in	
which	 submission	 to	government	became	a	 cardinal	virtue,	 and	 the	
Cameronians	were	air-brushed	out	of	our	history.
Which	 itself	calls	 in	question	 the	extent	 to	which	 the	Protestant	
vision	was	ever	 realised	 in	Scotland.	What	 cannot	be	questioned	 is	
that	 the	 last	hundred	years	have	seen	the	end	of	‘Christian	Britain’.	
Secular	humanism	has	not	only	installed	its	own	values	where	those	of	
Christianity	once	reigned:	it	has	convinced	society	that	religion	has	no	
place	in	the	public	square.	Even	more	calamitously,	it	has	convinced	
the	church	herself,	with	the	result	that	we	have	retreated	into	rapidly	
shrinking	ghettoes,	where	we	can	practise	our	arcane	rituals	in	private.	
This	is	not	only	a	meek	capitulation	to	humanism.	It	 is	 the	betrayal	
of	the	Calvinist	vision	for	an	Anabaptist	monasticism	which	regards	
human	society	and	culture	as	beyond	redemption.	
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